







Effectiveness of early retirement disincentives: individual 
































Effectiveness of early retirement disincentives: individual welfare, 
distributional and fiscal implications 
Timm Bönke* 




Freie Universität Berlin and DIW Berlin 
February 2016 
 
Abstract: In aging societies, information on how to reform pension systems is essential to policy 
makers. This study scrutinizes effects of early retirement disincentives on retirement behavior, 
individual welfare, pensions and public budget. We employ administrative pension data and a detailed 
model of the German tax and social security system to estimate a structural dynamic retirement 
model. We find that labor market participation and retirement behavior in general are strongly 
influenced by the level of disincentives. Further, disincentives come at the cost of increasing inequality 
and individual welfare losses. Still, net public returns are more than five times as high as monetarized 
individual welfare losses. Our estimates also suggest that similar levels of net public returns achieved 
by indiscriminating pension cuts are associated with individual welfare losses that are at least twice 
as high. 
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1 Introduction  
Aging populations exert increasing financial pressure on pension systems around the globe. Therefore, 
this central feature of modern welfare states is, and has been, subject to many fundamental reforms. 
Typical examples include increasing eligibility ages (Mastrobuoni, 2009; Staubli and Zweimüller, 2013; 
Ataly and Barret, 2015), pension level adjustments (Haan and Prowse, 2014), and pension system 
restructuring (Laun and Wallenius, 2013).1 Apart from debates fueled by the Great Recession, the 
imminent retirement of baby-boomer cohorts calls for fundamental reforms of old age security in 
most welfare states in the near future. Thus, evaluations on different pension reforms are highly 
relevant when discussing future pension policy design. 
The German case is an excellent example. Until the late 1970s, the German pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
system was expanded, becoming one of the world's most generous programs, both in terms of 
replacement rates and early retirement provisions. Population aging, German reunification, and high 
unemployment rates since the late 1970s, however, caused a rising fiscal imbalance. Since the early 
1990s, the eligibility age has been increased, replacement rates have been lowered, and subsidies 
stimulating private old-age provisions have been introduced (e.g. Bönke et al., 2010). These reforms 
have direct implications for the financial situation of Germany's current and future pensioners. They 
alter the legal framework under which individual labor supply, retirement, savings, and fertility 
decisions are made (e.g. Börsch-Supan, 2000; Blundell, 2002). The effects are vast as statutory 
pensions account for about 85% of the average household disposable income for the elderly 
population (Börsch-Supan and Reil-Held, 2001). While many of these reforms have been undertaken 
in other countries in a similar fashion, some reforms are not yet fully investigated and deserve further 
attention.  
This study scrutinizes disincentives that lead to permanent pension deductions and increase with the 
distance between the actual/early and normal retirement age. Since individuals still have a (limited) 
choice, disincentives differ from indiscriminating pension cuts or raising the legal eligibility age for 
early retirement. Further, from a theoretical perspective, Diamond and Mirrless (1978) find similar 
reforms to reduce moral hazard problems in the pension scheme. We contribute to the existing 
literature with an analysis of both actual and potential behavior to provide a detailed overview on 
effects of retirement disincentives. At this, we contrast positive effects on public finances to negative 
effects on affected individuals. To provide comprehensive evidence on disincentives in general, we 
model a broad range of disincentive levels. This range includes pension deductions of 0.3% per month 
                                                          
1 A broad overview of select reforms is provided by Gruber and Wise (2007). 
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of early retirement, which were actually introduced through a major pension reform in Germany in 
1992 (Hanel, 2010; Lüthen, 2015). We analyze to what extent disincentives are able to steer 
retirement behavior and provide evidence on distributional, individual welfare and fiscal implications 
of reducing pensions for early retirees. Typically for pension reforms, the institutional changes were 
phased in, impacting birth cohorts to different degrees. Thus, evaluation is not trivial due to the lack 
of intra-cohort variation. We incorporate comprehensive dynamic incentives of labor market 
participation and retirement behavior by estimating a structural dynamic retirement model (e. g. Rust 
and Phelan, 1997; Gustman and Steinmeier, 2015). Then, we model forward-looking agents who 
consider option values of possible retirement decisions and, thus, recognize the impact of their 
choices on the accumulation of pension wealth and future consumption possibilities. 
Retirement disincentives give individuals the choice to retire within a certain time period at the cost 
of actuarial adjustments. When modeling retirement behavior, dynamic incentives are particularly 
relevant because individuals account for the entire future stream of pension benefits (Coile and 
Gruber, 2007). For an accurate estimation, we model the German tax and social security system in 
great detail and utilize high quality German administrative pension data. This enables us to disentangle 
other changes in the tax and pension system from the introduction of the disincentives, which induce 
cohort specific dynamic incentives. The inter-cohort variation in dynamic incentives helps identifying 
the structural parameters of our retirement model (e.g. Manoli et al., 2014). Then, based on the 
estimated parameters, we simulate a variety of economic outcomes for a number of counterfactual 
scenarios with changing levels of retirement disincentives.  
For working males and the disincentive level of the 1992 reform, we find a retirement entry delay of 
5.5 months. Increasing the disincentives causes further delay; a tripling of the 1992 disincentive level 
encourages most individuals to completely abandon early retirement. We also find disincentives to 
increase inequality in expected consumption, to cause individual welfare losses, and to lead to positive 
net public returns. All three outcomes increase with the disincentive level, although with diminishing 
marginal returns. The welfare losses are heterogeneously spread across the earnings distribution and 
greatest for medium income earners. Still, at each disincentive level, the net public returns are more 
than five times as high as monetarized individual welfare losses. Further, depending on disincentive 
level, net public returns can correspond to up to 16% of total pension expenditure per individual. It 
follows that early retirement disincentives are able to substantially increase the pension system's 
financial stability. Comparing disincentives to indiscriminating pension cuts, we find that at similar 
levels of net public returns, pension cuts result in individual welfare losses that are more than twice 
as high.  
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The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The next section describes the institutional 
setting in Germany and the data. Section 3 illustrates the conceptual framework. The core of the paper 
is Section 4, where we present our estimation results and conduct a policy analysis. Section 5 
concludes. 
2 Institutional setting and data  
2.1 German pension scheme 
The German statutory pension system is a pay-as-you-go system of Bismarckian variety. The great 
majority of employees is mandatorily insured, contributing a percentage of their income up to a 
contribution ceiling based on their gross wage. For their contributions, the insurants acquire pension 
entitlements in form of earnings (or remuneration) points. Earnings points are calculated as ratio of 
employee's wage to average wage. Hence, the number of earnings points corresponds to one (per 
year) if the employee's yearly wage corresponds to the average yearly wage. Over their working life 
employees accumulate earnings points until retirement. At retirement the individual pension level is 
calculated on the basis of these accumulated earnings points (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸). Thus, the pension level mirrors the 
length of the working life and the average position in the earnings distribution. The pension formula 
(§ 64, Sozialgesetzbuch VI) provides the details on how to calculate the monthly pension 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 for 
individual 𝑛𝑛: 2 
𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛 ∙ 𝑍𝑍𝑛𝑛 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛 
where 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 corresponds to the pension value. Basically, the pension value is the amount of money that 
is multiplied with the sum of earnings points 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 to calculate the monthly pension. The value is 
adjusted every calendar year (for an overview see Table 2 below). 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 represents the pension type, 
which is 1 for old-age pensions. The factor 𝑍𝑍 is introduced by the 1992 reform to reflect the retirement 
age and the deductions due to early retirement:  𝑍𝑍 =  (1 − 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛). 
The pension scheme offers various retirement possibilities depending on the retiree's individual 
situation. We focus on agents who have a choice between continuing to work and retirement, 
therefore abstracting from previously unemployed or disabled individuals. The individuals considered 
are able to claim the normal old-age pension at age 65 or the pension for long-term insured after age 
                                                          
2 Appendix A1 provides an overview on key institutional figures. For further details on the calculation of 
pensions in Germany see Lüthen (2015). 
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63, which is conditioned on having spent at least 35 years in the pension system.3 Retiring before age 
65 is viewed as early retirement. Women are excluded due to their diverging pension prospects and 
the low number of cases when conditioning on similar early retirement eligibility. In sum, we 
concentrate on men with a strong labor market attachment who are eligible to retire at age 63, even 
if they choose to work longer. 
2.2 Introduction of early retirement disincentives 
In 1992, Germany introduced a major pension reform to equalize different retirement ages 
monetarily. The aim was to balance the pension wealth of early retirees and normal retirees. However, 
the budget relief was also needed to ensure stable contribution rates (e.g. Schmähl, 2011). Since early 
retirees have a prolonged benefit period, one possibility was to reduce their pension wealth. 
Therefore, the reform implemented permanent pension deductions of 0.3% per month of early 
retirement. The deduction level results from the distance (in month times 0.3%) between the actual 
retirement age and normal retirement age of 65.4 Still, all cohorts were allowed to retire at 63. The 
deductions were gradually phased in for the 1937 and 1938 cohorts, then fully affecting those born 
thereafter. At this, the maximum deduction starts at 0.3% for those born in January 1937 and increases 
by 0.3 % points per month of birth up to 7.2% for cohorts born after 1938. Thus, the individuals born 
during the phase-in are only partially affected by the reform. Table 1 provides an overview and 
exemplary date of birth examples. 
Table 1: Phase-in of disincentives 
 
 







Before 1937 63 0 0% 
January 1937 63+1 month 1 0.3% 
June 1937 63+6 month 6 1.8% 
January 1938 64+1 month 13 3.9% 
June 1938 64+6 month 19 5.7% 
After 1938 65 24 7.2% 
Note: The maximal deduction (share) determines the age factor 𝑍𝑍 in the pension formula. Source: 
SUFVSKT2002, 2004-12. 
                                                          
3 We disregard individuals claiming old-age pensions for previously unemployed or disabled persons. These can 
be claimed at age 60 under different eligibility criteria like time spend in the pension system. These “waiting 
periods” consist of periods of contributions, wage replacement benefits (unemployment, sick-pay, invalidity), 
child-raising and times of education. A detailed overview on eligibility and pension types is provided in Lüthen 
(2015). 
4 See Lüthen (2015) for further details. The reform also introduces a pension bonus of 0.5 % per month retiring 
after 65, but this affects only a negligible amount of individuals. Due to dominance of collective bargaining for 




To calculate pension entitlements as described above, the pension insurance collects information on 
all contributors' earnings biographies. The dataset we use, the Insurance Account Sample 
(Versicherungskontenstichprobe, VSKT), is a stratified random sample of these records. Each wave 
contains information on individuals aged between 30 and 67 in the reference year.5 From age 14 
through age 65, the VSKT provides a monthly history of employment, unemployment, sickness, and 
earnings points. The latter are used to compute monthly gross earnings. The total sum of earnings 
points provides the foundation for calculating gross pensions. To obtain net incomes, we subtract 
taxes and social security contributions. We account for all regulations and changes affecting monthly 
disposable income and pensions. An additional scenario that implements the regulations of the first 
year considered in this study, 1998, for all later years is also estimated. This allows the 
disentanglement of other changes in the tax and pension system from changes induced by the 
disincentives. For further details, see Figure 2 and Appendix A. 
To ensure early retirement eligibility, we restrict the sample to those who have spent at least 35 years 
in the pension system before turning 63. This also ensures that the sample does not include individuals 
with substantial labor market earnings unnoticed by the Federal Pension Insurance (i.e. self-employed, 
civil servants, or long-term emigrants). Further, we exclude individuals who have worked in the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR; the former East Germany). For the cohorts considered, neither 
the labor market situation nor working life is comparable to the West German context.6 The final 
sample contains 945 individuals (Table 2).  
While German social security data records earnings very accurately, one major drawback is the top 
coding of earnings information at the contribution ceiling. For a better approximation of true 
distribution of earnings above the ceiling, we impute earnings of all individuals affected by top coding. 
The imputation method is based on the assumption of Pareto-distributed earnings in the upper tail of 
the distribution.7 Further, the VSKT lacks information on other income sources, wealth or household 
context. A comparison with survey data reveals that these limitations are not harmful. The considered 
                                                          
5 We use the scientific use files for on-site-use (waves SUFVSKT2002 and SUFVSKT2004 to SUFVSKT2012), 
provided to researchers by the Data Research Center of the German Federal Pension Insurance. We use all 10 
waves in our analysis (see Appendix B for further information). 
6 West-East migration only affects an empirically negligible share of the population (Schündeln and Schündeln, 
2009). 
7 Bönke et al. (2015) provide a detailed description of the imputation procedure in Online Appendix III.3. They 
find that, on average, top coding affects 7 % of all West German men in the VSKT. 
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group of individuals receives income almost exclusively from statutory pensions and wages.8 This 
income also accounts on average for more than 90% of their total household income (Table A4).  
Nearly 80% are married.  Accordingly, we assume a married single-earner household and joint taxation. 
For robustness, we also calculate a scenario assuming only single households (Tables B1 and B2). Our 
results are robust to this assumption.     
Table 2 provides key descriptives of the sample. Column 1 shows that the observed average retirement 
entry age increases by about 8 months across cohorts. Column 2 reveals declining average pensions 
in real terms, although pension entitlements remain stable across cohorts (column 3). Columns 4 and 
5 add further insights to this development by showing the pension value and the average amount of 
disincentives. At age 65, the pension value slightly increases up to cohort 1937 and then decreases for 
later cohorts (calendar years 2000-2010).9 The column “disincentives” gives the average deduction on 
the monthly pension realized by each cohort. For fully affected cohorts, the average deduction 
fluctuates between 2.6% and 4.3%. All changes are accounted for when modeling the institutional 
background. 
Table 2: Sample descriptives  
 










1935 63.55 1680.97 57.73 28.91 0.00 53 
1936 63.67 1660.76 55.98 28.71 0.00 43 
1937 63.61 1636.40 55.72 29.18 1.06 50 
1938 63.75 1565.26 54.42 29.03 3.70 72 
1939 63.89 1607.84 56.33 28.70 4.28 84 
1940 64.03 1558.46 54.84 28.27 3.77 93 
1941 64.06 1564.30 55.85 27.83 3.69 77 
1942 64.32 1580.62 56.08 27.28 2.67 95 
1943 64.36 1574.17 55.01 26.81 2.56 122 
1944 64.31 1555.39 54.57 27.18 2.73 115 
1945 64.23 1562.70 55.82 27.20 3.08 141 
Note: The average pensions and the pension values are in 2010 Euro values. The numbers of observations 
represent the final sample. Source: SUFVSKT2002, 2004-12, Deutsche Rentenversicherung (2014), (own 
calculations). 
 
                                                          
8 Tables A3 and A4 provide information on the relevance of different income sources and marital status. For 
the overall population, Bönke et al. (2015) document that the VSKT represents about 80% of the total male 
labor force in West Germany and that its cross-sectional earnings distributions are similar to those found in 
survey data.  




3 Model and estimation  
3.1 Dynamic retirement model 
In the following we introduce our theoretical framework step by step. The model aims to explain 
retirement behavior in a time frame of 24 months, namely between age 63 and age 65. Still, 
implications for future years spent in retirement are also accounted for and correspond to individuals’ 
particular choices. We rely on a theoretical framework where agents’ utility in period 𝑑𝑑 depends on 
consumption 𝑑𝑑 and disutility of labor 𝑙𝑙. The total number 𝑁𝑁 of individuals is indexed by 𝑛𝑛. Discrete 
time is measured in months 𝑑𝑑, running up to age 100 (period 𝑇𝑇). Then, 𝑑𝑑 also expresses individual age, 
where 𝑑𝑑 = 0 corresponds to the month an agent turns 63. Consumption in t for individual 𝑛𝑛 equals 
net income flow from earnings, pensions or social security transfers, and disutility of labor depends 
on working or not in 𝑑𝑑. Agent 𝑛𝑛’s utility in month 𝑑𝑑 is then:  
(1) 𝑑𝑑(𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡, 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡)  
Further, we assume risk averse agents. Current and future consumption possibilities in month 𝑑𝑑 
depend on earnings biography and choices until the current period, whereas disutility of labor is 
allowed to vary in age 𝑑𝑑. Equation (1) becomes:    
(2) 𝑑𝑑(𝑑𝑑(𝒔𝒔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡), 𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 , 𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛) )  
where 𝒔𝒔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 denotes a vector of state variables (age, birth cohort, accumulated pension points, gross 
wage, and previous period's choice) and 𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 ∈ {0,1} is a dummy variable indicating the retirement 
choice. Hence, 𝑑𝑑(𝒔𝒔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡) denotes the level of consumption associated with state 𝒔𝒔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 and choice  𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡. 
Due to our short time frame of two years, we abstract from private savings. Thus, individual disposable 
income corresponds to consumption in the respective period.10 Disutility of labor 𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 , 𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛) is both a 
function of 𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 (since there is no more disutility of labor after retirement) and age 𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛. For the explicit 
form, we assume a time separable random utility model representing individual preferences that 
satisfy our assumptions on consumption and disutility of labor: 
                                                          
10 Before retirement, individuals earn a gross wage. In case of early retirement, some monthly wages between 
ages 63 and 65 are unobserved. We impute the counterfactual wage relying on the last real wage observed in 
the respective month of the previous year. This corresponds to the wage observed 12 or 24 month before the 




(3) 𝑑𝑑(𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡, 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡) = 𝛼𝛼 𝑑𝑑(𝒔𝒔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡)(1−𝜌𝜌) − 1(1 − 𝜌𝜌) + 𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 , 𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛) + 𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡(𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡)  
We assume the random component 𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡(𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡) to be type 1 extreme value distributed. The random 
component represents individual utility shocks not observed by the researcher. 𝜌𝜌 depicts the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion and 𝛼𝛼 a consumption weight. To allow the disutility of labor to vary 
in age, age enters 𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡, 𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛) as a linear spline function. The function is allowed to change the slope 
every three months of age to ensure a flexible specification: 






𝛿𝛿2 𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛(𝑑𝑑   ,3)       𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑 > 0+ 𝛿𝛿3 𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛(𝑑𝑑 −   3,3) 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑 > 3+ 𝛿𝛿4 𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛(𝑑𝑑 −   6,3) 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑 > 6




When timing retirement decisions, agents are forward looking and maximize their expected lifetime 
utility according to their preferences constrained by the institutional setting. Here, for each month 
between ages 63 and 65, agents decide between continuing to work or retirement. When continuing 
to work, utility stems from consumption only, but individuals experience disutility of labor. After 
retirement, agents receive utility from consumption only. In line with the rules and regulations of the 
pension system, working individuals accumulate pension claims proportional to real wages. This 
creates dynamic incentives for individuals taken into account by the dynamic choice framework. 
Retirement is an absorbing state and agents are not allowed to return to work, making utility 
maximization an optimal stopping problem. Earliest possible retirement choice is at 𝑑𝑑 = 1 in the 
month following the 63rd birthday, latest possible early retirement decision is at age 64, month 12 (𝑑𝑑 =24). Each month 𝑑𝑑, individual 𝑛𝑛 observes state variables 𝒔𝒔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 and makes retirement choice 𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 to 
maximize expected lifetime utility  𝐸𝐸. We define 𝐷𝐷(𝒔𝒔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡) to be the choice set available to individual 𝑛𝑛 
in period 𝑑𝑑 and to contain the choice between employment and retirement:  
(5) max
𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛∈ 𝐷𝐷(𝒔𝒔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) 𝐸𝐸 � 𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡+𝑗𝑗𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗=0
𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑�𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡+𝑗𝑗, 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡+𝑗𝑗��  
with 𝛽𝛽 denoting a monthly subjective time discount factor, which we derive from a yearly discount 
factor of 0.96 (Gourinchas and Parker, 2002). To accommodate our monthly setting, we implement 
𝛽𝛽 = √0.96 12  . 𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡+𝑗𝑗 indicates individual probabilities of being alive in period 𝑑𝑑 + 𝑗𝑗, conditional on 
survival until period 𝑑𝑑 and belonging to cohort 𝑏𝑏. Cohort specific mortality rates ensure a realistic setup 
10 
 
and also help identifying parameters in the estimation procedure by inducing cohort-specific 
heterogeneity in dynamic incentives.11 
We further define a Markov transition function 𝑞𝑞(𝒔𝒔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡+1|𝒔𝒔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡) to capture individual beliefs about 
future states. Since 𝒔𝒔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡+1 evolves from state variables and agents are assumed to have perfect 
foresight about future states, 𝑞𝑞(𝒔𝒔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡+1|𝒔𝒔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡) is a deterministic function. The only function not 
evolving deterministically is the utility shock 𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡(𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡), which is not regarded as a state variable. 
Therefore, agents’ maximization problem corresponds to the following value function 𝑣𝑣(𝒔𝒔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡):   
(6) 
𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡(𝒔𝒔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡) = max
𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛∈ 𝐷𝐷(𝒔𝒔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)  �𝑑𝑑(𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡, 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡)  





where 𝑔𝑔(⋅) represents a multivariate probability density function of the random components. 𝑆𝑆(𝒔𝒔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡) 
contains all possible different states in 𝑑𝑑 + 1 given state 𝒔𝒔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡. The difference in the expected discounted 
future utility between working and not working reflects option values of respective choices. 
3.2 Choice probabilities and estimation 
This section features the model estimation. Given the finite horizon of the individuals’ optimization 
problem, it can be solved recursively. Starting point is the expected value function 𝑉𝑉(⋅) for particular 
choice options in the last period 𝑇𝑇. 𝑉𝑉(⋅) needs to be computed for all possible choices. In the last 
period 𝑇𝑇, it corresponds to  
(7) 𝑉𝑉(𝒔𝒔𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇 ,𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇) = 𝐸𝐸[𝑑𝑑(𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇 , 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇)]   
By Bellman's principle of optimality, the individual's optimization problem can be written as a two-
period problem for all other time periods 𝑑𝑑, which take into account the optimal decision for 𝑑𝑑 + 1. 
Due to the type 1 extreme value distribution of utility shock 𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡(𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡),  the expected value function 
has a closed form solution (Rust, 1987):  
 
                                                          
11 To account for increasing life expectancy, we use official mortality tables supplying cohort-specific 




𝑉𝑉(𝒔𝒔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 ,𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡) = 𝐸𝐸[𝑑𝑑(𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 , 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡)]  
+𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡+1𝛽𝛽 � log� � 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝�𝑉𝑉(𝒔𝒔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡+1,𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡+1)�
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Computation of expected value functions between mandatory retirement (age 65) and 𝑇𝑇 is 
comparatively simple as individual choices are limited until age 65. Thereafter, real net income 
streams remain constant. Rust (1987) shows that when assuming additive separability and conditional 
independence of utility shocks, conditional choice probabilities have a closed form solution (here 
mixed logit probabilities): 
(9) 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏(𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡|𝒔𝒔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡) = 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝�𝑉𝑉(𝒔𝒔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡)�∑ 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝�𝑉𝑉(𝒔𝒔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 , 𝑗𝑗)�𝑗𝑗∈𝐷𝐷(𝒔𝒔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)   
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood. The log-likelihood function of the sample is given by 








with 𝐼𝐼(𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡) indicating the individual choice observed in period 𝑑𝑑 and the vector 𝝀𝝀 = (𝛼𝛼,𝜌𝜌, 𝛿𝛿1, . . , 𝛿𝛿9) 
containing all parameters of the utility function. The likelihood contributions then correspond to the 
respective conditional choice probabilities, abstracting from random transitions of state variables. For 
robustness, we also estimate a model specification allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in 𝛿𝛿1 
(Heckman and Singer, 1984). We further include a robustness test where unobserved types are 
modeled as a function of lifetime earnings until age 63 to account for a possible correlation between 
leisure preferences and employment history (Wooldridge, 2005). Still, neither the central preference 
parameter 𝜌𝜌 nor any of our postestimation outcomes are sensitive to these extensions.12  
3.3 Parameter estimates and model fit  
An overview on parameter estimates is displayed in Table 4. Our estimate of the relative risk aversion, 
𝜌𝜌 = 1.5, is in line with previous studies (see e.g. Chetty, 2006), although our identification is based on 
retirement choices only. The estimates of the spline function 𝑙𝑙(∙) indicate the results typically found 
in the literate: a spiking retirement hazard at early eligibility and normal retirement age that cannot 
                                                          
12Although we can identify two types, the second type is estimated to make up only a small fraction of the 
population and precision of the respective type-specific parameter is low. Initial conditions exert no significant 
effect on type probabilities. See Appendix B for results and details on the estimation. 
12 
 
be explained entirely by incentives but rather mirrors institutional constraints (e.g. Coile and Gruber, 
2007). Here, this is reflected by the high negative estimate for 𝛿𝛿1 (mitigated by 𝛿𝛿2 when continuing to 
work) and the high positive estimate for 𝛿𝛿9. All estimates are independent of their starting values and 
the small standard errors indicate precise estimation. In the following, confidence intervals of 
postestimates are computed by applying a parametric bootstrapping method. Based on the inverse of 
the Hessian of the log-likelihood function, the procedure relies on 200 draws from the asymptotic 
sampling distribution of the estimated model parameters. Figure 1 compares predicted and observed 
shares of retirees by age and shows a very good internal validity. 
Table 3: Parameter estimates 
𝛼𝛼 0.215 𝛿𝛿3 -0.164 𝛿𝛿7 0.255 
 (0.0241)  (0.0665)  (0.1281) 
𝜌𝜌 1.506 𝛿𝛿4 0.032 𝛿𝛿8 -0.232 
 (0.0716)  (0.0647)  (0.1411) 
𝛿𝛿1 -3.015 𝛿𝛿5 0.080 𝛿𝛿9 1.212 
 (0.2476)  (0.0733)  (0.1343) 
𝛿𝛿2 1.057 𝛿𝛿6 -0.261   
 (0.1182)  (0.0916)   
Log-likelihood -1942.31         
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of predicted and observed shares of retirees
 
Source: SUFVSKT2002, 2004-12 
4 Results and policy analysis  
To analyze the economic effects of retirement disincentives in general, we simulate scenarios for 























the distance between each disincentive level to 0.1%, resulting in 10 counterfactual scenarios. Unless 
stated otherwise, the results are based on cohorts 1939 to 1945 which are fully affected by the 1992 
reform. This ensures meaningful comparisons among counterfactual scenarios.  We present 
predominantly graphical results; the actually implemented disincentive level of 0.3% per month is 
marked with a vertical dashed line. In sum, this section sheds light on the “dose-response” relationship 
between disincentive level and outcome measure and still includes a full analysis of the 1992 reform. 
A. Labor market effects 
Here we look at the effects of disincentives on labor market exit timing. Figure 2 displays a concave 
relationship between average retirement age and disincentive level. This suggests that disincentives 
can be used to steer retirement behavior. While low disincentive levels lead to small postponements 
in retirement, high levels induce most individuals to retire at age 65 such that hardly any penalties are 
actually realized (“prohibitive effect”). The actually implemented level causes a postponement of 
about 5.5 months, whereas the highest disincentive level would have delayed retirement by about 15 
months. 
Figure 2: Expected retirement age by disincentive level
 
Source: SUFVSKT2002, 2004-12 
To look more closely at the labor market effect, Figure 3 provides changes in expected retirement age 
by birth cohort. We focus on the 0.3%-disincentive level introduced by the 1992 reform and show how 
much of the cohorts’ retirement postponement can be attributed to the reform. Panel (a) displays 
predicted changes due to the introduction of disincentives. Panel (b) additionally shows observed 
changes from cohorts 1935 to 1945 as well as predicted changes attributed to disincentives, the 
pension value and the tax system. Panel (a) indicates that the disincentives delay average retirement 
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smaller effects for cohorts 1937 and 1938, which were affected by the reform’s phase-in. Comparing 
observed entries and predictions across cohorts, the introduction of disincentives explains 68% of the 
observed change in retirement patterns. Panel (b) demonstrates that changes in tax system and 
pension value delay retirement by an additional month. In total, the model explains about 80% of the 
average increase in retirement age between the 1935 and 1945 cohorts. This total predicted change 
relies on a counterfactual where tax and pension legislation from 1998 hold for all agents. This mirrors 
the institutional setting of agents born in 1935 at age 63, which is the point of their first decision about 
early retirement.  
Figure 3: Reform effects on expected retirement age by birth cohort 
 
Source: SUFVSKT2002, 2004-12 
B. Financial implications 
Here we analyze disincentive effects on pension level and NPVs of remaining lifetime consumption.13 
The individual pension level is affected by two countervailing effects induced by the reform. First, early 
retirement entails a penalty on pension benefits. Second, individuals delay exiting the labor market 
and receive labor earnings for a longer period of time (notice that wages exceed pension benefits in 
most cases). More contributions then translate into higher pension claims. Thus, the behavioral effect 
of delayed retirement is able to counteract the disincentive effect at some point. With that in mind, it 
is not surprising that Figure 4 shows a u-shaped relationship between pension and disincentive level. 
The actually implemented disincentive level of 0.3% per month yields the lowest average pension — 
both reducing and enhancing the disincentive level increases average retirement income. When 
decreasing the disincentive level, the behavioral reactions are small but pensions still rise. When 
                                                          
 






















Predicted: Disincentives; 95% CI in graph (a) Observed change
Predicted: Disincentives, pension value, tax system Predicted: Disincentives, pension value
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increasing, the behavioral effect outweighs the penalty effect and pensions increase. For the actually 
implemented level of the 1992 reform, we find that pensions decrease by €32 per month. Put another 
way, the average individual loses a bit more than the equivalent of one year of average pension 
entitlements (i.e. one earnings point). Figure 6 also shows a similar relationship between disincentive 
level and remaining lifetime consumption. Interestingly, the lowest NPV realized is associated with a 
disincentive level of 0.1%. At a level of 0.2%, the increases in labor market earnings start to outweigh 
the decreases in pension level. 
Figure 4: NPVs of expected consumption and retirement income by disincentive level
 
Note: Euro in 2010 real values. Source: SUFVSKT2002, 2004-12 
C. Individual welfare effects 
Figures 5 displays potential costs associated with the considered range of disincentive levels. Panel (a) 
provides estimates on increasing inequality in remaining lifetime consumption (Gini coefficient).  
Without disincentives retirement behavior is more heterogeneous, which offsets some initial 
inequalities in pension claims at age 63. Panel (b) assesses expected individual welfare losses 
(compensating variations, CV). 14 The variations refer to NPVs at age 63 that are annuitized over the 
remaining lifetime. Obviously, individuals who would have worked until age 65 even without 
disincentives are unaffected. The estimates provide quantifications for the average decline in 
individual welfare and further allow a disaggregated analysis of individual welfare losses along the 
income distribution.  
                                                          
14 A compensating variation (CV) indicates the amount of money that an individual would have to receive at 
age 63 to be fully compensated for a particular reform. Here, to compute CVs, we employ an iterative 
algorithm targeting the expected remaining lifetime utilities at age 63 without retirement disincentives. The 
algorithm converges when the differences in individuals’ expected utilities under both scenarios (disincentives 
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Both Gini and CV show a concave relationship to the level of disincentives. Increases at low 
disincentives levels cause large increases in Gini and CV. Increases at higher disincentive levels have 
smaller effects since at high disincentive levels, the average retirement age is close to 65 already (see 
Figure 2). We find that the relationship flattens out around a disincentive level of 0.7%. For the highest 
considered disincentive level, the overall effects amount to twice the effects attributed to the actually 
implemented reform (vertical dashed line) ─ a 10% increase in the Gini and a CV of about €8000.  
Figure 5: Gini and CVs by disincetive level 
 
Note: Euro in 2010 real values. Source: SUFVSKT2002, 2004-12 
For a detailed analysis, we again focus on the 0.3% disincentive level implemented by the 1992 reform. 
Figure 6 concentrates on the CV and reveals that individual welfare losses are heterogeneously 
distributed in the sample population, ranging from negligible amounts up to almost €9,000. This 
complicates compensation through e.g. saving subsidies because such a scheme may not allow for the 
targeting of individuals according to their specific losses.15 Figure 7 shows a non-parametric regression 
of estimated compensating variations on NPVs of expected consumption. The results suggest that 
medium income earners lose most through the introduction of retirement disincentives. This is driven 
by earnings-level heterogeneity in the expected retirement age. Low and high income individuals tend 







                                                          
15 Indeed, in 2002 Germany introduced subsidies for private pension plans to compensate employees for lower 
levels of expected PAYG-pensions due to various reforms. For a distributional analysis and further details see 
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Figure 6: Distribution of compensating variations  
 
Note: Euro in 2010 real values. Source: SUFVSKT2002, 2004-12 
 
Figure 7: Predicted CVs and expected retirement age by NPVs of consumption 
 
Note: Euro in 2010 real values. Source: SUFVSKT2002, 2004-12 
 
D. Fiscal implications 
Figure 8 displays the (fiscal) benefits of introducing disincentives − the net public returns at varying 
levels. We again find the relationship to be concave. Although the returns are diminishing, increasing 
disincentives beyond the implemented level (vertical dashed line) would further foster the pension 
system's financial sustainability. At each disincentive level, about half of the net public returns are 
generated by reduced pension wealth, while the remainder is divided into increases in pension 
contributions and increases in tax payments and other contributions.  
The net public returns can be linked to pension expenditures under a no disincentive scenario. This 
reveals that net public returns correspond to about 9% of average pension wealth under the actually 
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implemented 0.3%-scenario (€ 21,994; vertical dashed line) and to 16% at the 1%-disincentive level. 
These fiscal implications are substantial. Resorting to aggregate data of the German pension 
insurance, we find that our sample population corresponds to 424,286 individuals for the 1939 to 1945 
cohorts affected by the 1992 reform (Deutsche Rentenversicherung, 2014). We assess that the 
simulated public returns per capita at the 0.3% disincentive level translate into overall public gains of 
424,286 × € 21,994 ≈ € 9.33 billion for these cohorts. 
Relating costs (Figure 5) and benefits (Figure 8) demonstrates that this increase in financial stability 
comes at the cost of increasing inequality and non-negligible individual welfare losses within the 
population of retirees. Still, at each disincentive level, net public returns are about five times as high 
average individual welfare losses. 
Figure 8: Net public returns by disincetive level 
 
Note: Euro in 2010 real values. Source: SUFVSKT2002, 2004-12 
E. Alternative reforms 
To set the welfare losses into perspective, we simulate scenarios where we indiscriminately cut all 
pensions by a certain amount, ranging from 1% to 10% (Figure 9). It turns out that to yield equal net 
public returns to introducing a 0.3%-disincentive level, all pensions would have to be lowered by about 
8%. However, pension cuts more than double the individual welfare losses. This holds also true for 
higher levels of net public returns. Since individuals barely adjust their retirement behavior when 
confronted with a pension cut, nearly all the net public returns stem from decreased pensions: €113 
per month instead of €32 under the 0.3% disincentive level. These findings suggest that disincentives 
realize financial gains at lower individual costs than pension cuts.  
 
 
 Pension wealth 
 Other contributions and taxes 


















.1 .3 .5 .7 .9
Disincentives in % per month of early retirement
19 
 
Figure 9: Pension cuts – costs and benefits 
Note: Euro in 2010 real values. The red line indicates the level of pension cuts that correspond to the net public 
returns under a 0.3%-disincentive level. Source: SUFVSKT2002, 2004-12, own calculations 
 
5 Conclusion  
This study evaluates the effectiveness of early retirement disincentives and its distributional, 
individual welfare and fiscal implications. We focus on disincentives leading to permanent pension 
deductions that increase with the distance between actual/early and normal retirement age. We 
model different disincentive levels and analyze to what extent disincentives are able to steer 
retirement behavior. Our range of disincentive levels includes the level actually implemented by the 
1992 pension reform in Germany, which introduced permanent pension deductions of 0.3% per 
month of early retirement. For the actually implemented level, we estimate an increase in retirement 
age of 5.5 months. This implies that the reform is responsible for 68% of the observed change in 
retirement patterns across cohorts. Further simulations demonstrate that tripling the actually 
implemented level would essentially prevent individuals from opting for early retirement at all. Dose 
response reveals that disincentives increase inequality in expected consumption, cause individual 
welfare losses, and lead to positive net public returns. All three show a concave relationship with the 
disincentive level. The individual welfare losses are largest for medium income earners and difficult to 
compensate due to their heterogeneous distribution. However, at each disincentive level, the net 
public returns are more than five times as high as the individual welfare losses. Overall welfare in the 
economy may increase regardless, given that longer life expectancies and demographic change 
requires a reform of either the contribution scheme or the level of pension benefits. 
Contrary to many public claims, disincentives do not correspond to an indiscriminating pension cut. In 
fact, at equal levels of net public returns, disincentives cause individual welfare losses that are less 
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than half as large as those under a pension cut. Concerning future implications, Germany introduced 
various major pension reforms, two of which can be directly related to our results. The first reform 
increases the normal retirement age to 67 while the early retirement age remains at 63. This increases 
the disincentives for early retirees. Here, our results suggest that average retirement age increases 
and average pensions adjust slightly for individuals still employed at 62. The second reform introduces 
an exception to the rule by abolishing disincentives for pensioners with very long employment 
histories. According to our results, this will cause a substantial decline in average retirement age for 





Appendix A: Taxation, social security contributions and sample selection  
The income from PAYG-pensions and employment constructed from the available information 
provided in the VSKT is gross. To obtain net incomes, we subtract social security contributions and 
personal income taxes from gross earnings and pensions. Because the burden of taxes and social 
security contributions heavily depends on whether being an employee or retiree, a concise overview 
of the procedure and underlying assumptions to obtain net incomes is provided in subsections A.1 
and A.2. 
A.1 Social security contributions 
The calculation of social security contributions is straightforward. Regular employees considered in 
our sample must contribute to the pension, unemployment, health and long term care insurance. 
Pensioners only have to contribute to the health and long term care insurance. Note that rates for 
pensioners and regular employees differ. Assessment basis is insurable income up to the respective 
contribution ceiling. Tables A1 and A2 list the key determinants used for calculating statutory social 
security contributions for the 1998 to 2011 assessment years. Displayed contribution rates are annual 
averages. In case of the statutory health insurance, actual contribution rates differ between insurance 
providers. Our calculation assumes the average contribution rates published by Deutsche 
Rentenversicherung (2014). Further, employees with earnings above the compulsory insurance 
exemption limit may opt for a private health insurance instead of the statutory. We disregard this 
possibility.  
Between 1998 and 2011, employees face a joint burden on gross earnings from contributions of 
roughly 23%, not including the employer's share. Social security contributions are usually almost 
evenly split between employee and employer. Gross earnings are net of employer's contribution and 
therefore only the employee's contributions need to be deducted. The burden differs with total 
remuneration. Low income earners and those receiving incomes above the respective contribution 
ceilings of the various branches of the social security system are subject to a lower relative burden. 
Social security contributions are calculated on hypothetical gross annual earnings and then deducted 
from gross monthly earnings. In contrast to employees, pensioners are subject to a combined average 




Table A1: Pension and unemployment insurance 
Year 
Average social 






1998 DM 52925 DM 100800 10.15 3.25 
1999 DM 53507 DM 102000 9.85 3.25 
2000 DM 54256 DM 103200 9.65 3.25 
2001 DM 55216 DM 104400 9.55 3.25 
2002 € 28626 € 54000 9.55 3.25 
2003 € 28938 € 61200 9.75 3.25 
2004 € 29060 € 61800 9.75 3.25 
2005 € 29202 € 62400 9.75 3.25 
2006 € 29494 € 63000 9.75 3.25 
2007 € 29951 € 63000 9.95 2.1 
2008 € 30625 € 63600 9.95 1.65 
2009 € 30506 € 64800 9.95 1.4 
2010 € 31144 € 66000 9.95 1.4 
2011 € 32100 € 66000 9.95 1.5 
Note: Values until 2001 in DM and in Euro thereafter. One Euro corresponds to 1.95583 DM. Contribution 
rates are annual averages for employees, contributions for employers differ slightly. Pensioners are not 
subject to pension or unemployment insurance contributions. Source: Deutsche Rentenversicherung (2014) 
(own calculations). 
 
Table A2: Health and long-term care insurance 
Year Contribution ceiling 
Contribution rate 





Health and long 
term care insurance 
– pensioners 
1998 DM 75600 6.8 7.575 0.85 
1999 DM 76500 6.8 7.6253 0.85 
2000 DM 77400 6.8 7.6 0.85 
2001 DM 78300 6.8 7.6 0.85 
2002 € 40500 7 7.725 0.85 
2003 € 41400 7.2 7.925 0.85 
2004 € 41856 7.2 8.27505 0.85 
2005 € 42300 8 9.05 1.1 
2006 € 42756 7.4 9.25 1.1 
2007 € 42756 7.7 9.4 1.1 
2008 € 43200 7.8 9.7 1.1 
2009 € 44100 7.9 10 1.225 
2010 € 45000 7.9 9.85 1.225 
2011 € 44550 8.2 10.15 1.225 
Note: Values until 2001 in DM and in Euro thereafter. One Euro corresponds to 1.95583 DM. Contribution 
rates are annual averages for employees/pensioners, contribution rates for employers/pensions insurance 






A.2 Personal income tax 
In Germany, personal income tax depends on several characteristics of the tax unit not available in 
our data. For our calculation we assume that all taxable income solely stems either from employment 
and/or PAYG pensions. Other sources of income are not recorded in our data. In Table A3 and A4 we 
provide an overview of the actual composition of household and individual incomes for the considered 
population according to the SOEP. The population depicted in Tables A3 and A4 mirrors our sample 
regarding age, region, employment status, earnings biography and gender. For our sample, household 
and individual incomes are predominantly comprised of earnings from employment and PAYG-
pensions, which can be observed in our data. Other pensions, transfers or asset income are negligible 
small. 
Table A3: Composition of individual income and marital status 
Age Employment Pensions Unempl. Married 
 Employed Self PAYG Other benefit  
 Share (Sd) Share (Sd) Share (Sd) Share (Sd) Share (Sd) Share (Sd) 
62 96 (16) 0 (2) 3 (14) 0 (0) 1 (7) 78 (48) 
63 92 (24) 1 (10) 7 (21) 0 (0) 1 (7) 76 (48) 
64 83 (32) 1 (9) 16 (31) 0 (3) 0 (4) 70 (47) 
65 58 (46) 0 (3) 41 (46) 1 (7) 0 (2) 73 (48) 
66 36 (41) 0 (6) 64 (41) 0 (1) 0 (1) 72 (47) 
67 10 (22) 1 (8) 89 (23) 0 (0) 0 (0) 72 (44) 
68 8 (21) 1 (7) 92 (22) 0 (0) 0 (0) 76 (44) 
Note: Income shares of total individual income in percent. Standard deviation (Sd) in parentheses. Sample 
comprised of West German males born between 1935 and 1945 in regular insurable employment at age 62. 
Source: SOEP waves 1984-2012. 
 
 
Table A4: Composition of household income  
Age Labor income PAYG Pensions Asset income 
 Share (Sd) Share (Sd) Share (Sd) 
62 87.81 (18.69) 6.10 (15.83) 4.18 (8.96) 
63 84.65 (22.48) 8.77 (19.01) 3.53 (6.82) 
64 75.71 (28.65) 17.23 (25.31) 3.90 (8.40) 
65 56.69 (38.86) 32.22 (34.73) 5.12 (8.72) 
66 39.22 (35.40) 47.93 (32.81) 4.58 (7.59) 
67 20.24 (25.77) 63.67 (28.14) 6.37 (10.38) 
68 17.54 (26.69) 67.73 (28.65) 5.57 (9.05) 
Note: Income shares of total household income in percent. Standard deviation (Sd) in 
parentheses. Sample comprised of households with a West German male born 





Table A3 shows that roughly three-quarters of the individuals are married. Because the martial status 
is not recorded in the data, we assume all tax units to be married and eligible for joint assessment.16 
For robustness, we also calculate a scenario where the tax units are assumed to be single. Due to the 
ages considered, we do not regard the case of tax relevant children.  
In general, after deductions of e. g. social security, the income tax schedule is applied. The income tax 
is calculated on yearly taxable income (earnings and pensions). To obtain the monthly income tax, the 
yearly tax burden is distributed according to the monthly share of taxable income on yearly taxable 
income. From 1998 to 2011, the code was subject to several changes, e.g: top marginal tax rates were 
reduced from 53% to 45%; taxation of pensions was reformed by the introduction of deferred taxation 
and changes in the deductibility of social security contributions. In addition, there were some minor 
alterations like changes in lump sum deductions. All these changes occur regularly between 1998 and 
2011, impacting the birth cohorts accordingly and influencing their retirement decisions. To 
disentangle the impact from changes in the income tax law from changes in the pension system, we 
simulate a counterfactual assuming the governing law of 1998 (see Appendix C). Concerning the 
taxation of income from employment and PAYG-pensions, our tax model in particular includes the 
following regulations:17  
• Income from employment: In order to obtain the taxable portion of income, gross earnings 
are reduced by a lump sum deduction for work related expenses (Werbungskostenpauschale).  
• Income form PAYG-pension: In case of pensions, the return portion (Ertragsanteil) is taxable 
only if the pensioner retired before 2005. For our sample, the return portion varies between 
27% and 29%, depending on retirement age. Beginning with 2005, the taxable portion 
(Besteuerungsanteil) depends on the year of retirement and ranges from 50% in 2005 to 62% 
in 2011. Further, the lump sum deduction for pensions is subtracted. 
• Special expenses (Sonderausgaben): The modelling concerning the deduction of social 
security contribution from taxable income (Vorsorgeaufwendungen) accounts for all changes 
between 1998 and 2011. Further, the lump sum deduction for special expenses 
(Sonderausgabenpauschbetrag) is subtracted. 
 
                                                          
16 Married couples profit from a splitting rule (Bönke and Eichfelder, 2010). We assume joint assessment and a 
single earner/pensioner without spousal income. 




The dataset consists of the waves of SUFVSKT of calendar years 2002 and 2004-2012. Each SUF is a 
25% stratified random sample of the VSTK of the respective year and includes the same information. 
Since we need completed biographies to clearly identify the timing of old-age retirement, we focus on 
cohorts aged 66 or 67 in the respective year only. This means that usable observations for cohorts 
1938-1945 appear in two different waves, once aged 66 and once aged 67. Due to the sampling 
structure it is possible to match those two waves for each of these cohorts and enhance the number 
of observations. Since there is no unique identifier across all waves, we identify duplicates (whom 
appear in both waves) on the basis of their employment biographies. For the selected cohorts, those 
biographies consist of monthly earnings points observations included from age 14 onwards up to the 
age of 66. Therefore, we draw on a large number of data points for the matching procedure and do 
not have to make any assumptions. For identification we use all of the at least 420 month (35 years) 
history as well as the year and month of birth. Verification checks further confirm the correctness of 
our procedure. Certainly, the matching procedure might be problematic for individuals without a 
strong labor market attachment - but those are not the persons we focus on. 
Appendix B: Robustness 
B.1 Inclusion of type-specific preference heterogeneity 
We implement preference heterogeneity in disutility of work by assuming two unobserved types18 
𝑚𝑚 ∈ {1,2} that comprise a fixed proportion of the population (Heckman and Singer, 1984). We assume 
that the constant in the spline function of the disutility of work 𝛿𝛿1 is heterogeneous for the unobserved 
types. Hence, equation (4) becomes: 






𝛿𝛿2 𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛(𝑑𝑑, 3) 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑 > 0+ 𝛿𝛿3 𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛(𝑑𝑑 −   3,3) 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑 > 3+ 𝛿𝛿4 𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛(𝑑𝑑 −   6,3) 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑 > 6




The results suggest that the second type with lower disutility comprises only about 9% of the 
population. The specification yields unprecise estimates for the parameter related to this type (δ12). 
Still, central parameters remain stable, the model fit improves only slightly, and postestimation 
                                                          
18For more than two unobserved types, the optimization algorithm did not converge. 
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outcomes are almost unaffected. Therefore, we conclude that our results are insensitive to the 
inclusion of preference heterogeneity and do not add it to the baseline specification. 
B.2 Type probabilities (unconditional and conditional on initial conditions) 
The probability that individual 𝑛𝑛 is of type 𝑚𝑚 is given by 𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚, where 𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚 is assumed to be logistic and 
can be modeled conditional on initial conditions at age 63. For the unconditional specification we 
assume: 
 𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚 = exp (𝛾𝛾1)1 + exp (𝛾𝛾1)   For the conditional specification we assume:  
      𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚 = exp (𝛾𝛾1 + 𝛾𝛾2𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛63/10)1 + exp (𝛾𝛾1 + 𝛾𝛾2𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛63/10)  
In the conditional specification, the probability that individual 𝑛𝑛 is of type 𝑚𝑚 is modeled as a function 
of the employment history at age 63. Thereby, we use real accumulated lifetime earnings (Bönke et. 
al., 2015) as a summary measure because it reflects both wage history and employment pattern over 
the working life cycle. 
By making the type probabilities a function of the employment and wage history at age 63, we account 
for non-random initial conditions at age 63. This approach follows Wooldridge (2005) and only 
requires the assumption that the initial condition is random conditional on real accumulated lifetime 
earnings at age 63. The log-likelihood function of the sample is then given by 





















w/o init. cond. 
Unobserved 
Heterogeneity 
with init. cond. 
α (consumption) 0.21516 0.2024 0.3203 0.32503 
 (0.024108) (0.026465) (0.035013) (0.040995) 
ρ (CRRA) 1.5065 1.5 1.5661 1.5784 
 (0.071666) (0.087501) (0.065832) (0.079646) 
δ1, δ11 (disutility, constant) -3.0154 -2.9948 -3.0742 -3.0743 
 (0.24757) (0.23875) (0.25671) (0.23648) 
δ12 (disutility, constant)   -1.5747 -1.5228 
   (2.3507) (2.384) 
𝛿𝛿2  (disutility, spline) 1.0568 1.0577 1.0561 1.0561 
 (0.11822) (0.11174) (0.12249) (0.11377) 
δ3  (disutility, spline) -0.16413 -0.16571 -0.16444 -0.16443 
 (0.066455) (0.062373) (0.071532) (0.070221) 
δ4  (disutility, spline) 0.032382 0.038399 0.032745 0.032774 
 (0.064722) (0.064915) (0.072272) (0.070505) 
δ5  (disutility, spline) 0.080143 0.077559 0.078887 0.078822 
 (0.073298) (0.072578) (0.078636) (0.07622) 
𝛿𝛿6  (disutility, spline) -0.26074 -0.26343 -0.25952 -0.2594 
 (0.091609) (0.093278) (0.099041) (0.091424) 
δ7  (disutility, spline) 0.25537 0.2551 0.24973 0.2493 
 (0.12815) (0.13244) (0.14189) (0.11686) 
δ8  (disutility, spline) -0.23207 -0.22357 -0.21365 -0.21193 
 (0.14114) (0.14541) (0.15405) (0.13698) 
δ9 (disutility, spline) 1.2119 1.2055 1.1328 1.1277 
 (0.13425) (0.13741) (0.15709) (0.15359) 
γ1 (constant, type)   2.2783 2.4235 
   (0.36287) (0.71499) 
γ2 (initial condition, type)    -0.0088864 
    (0.031546) 
Log-likelihood -1942 -1947 -1930 -1930 










w/o init. cond. 
Unobserved 
Heterogeneity 
with init. cond. 
∆E[retirement age] 
(months) 
5.54 5.07 5.80 5.77 
∆E[NPV of 
consumption] 
2,271 € -783 € 3,369 € 3,249 
∆E[NPV of 
consumption] (%) 
0.65 -0.40 1.07 1.04 
∆Gini coefficient (%) 
 
4.68 3.6 5.09 4.81 
∆Monthly retirement 
income  
€ -31.92 € -35.13 € -30.60 € -30.74 
Average compensating 
variation  
€ 3,913 € 3,561 € 4,615 € 4,604 
Average equivalent 
variation  
€ 3,754 € 3,453 € 4,296 € 4,297 
NPV of net public 
returns  
€ 21,994 € 22,825 € 22,784 € 22,650 
∆E[NPV of pension 
benefits]  
€ 13,754 € 13,450 € 13,851 € 13812 
∆E[NPV of pension 
contributions]  
€ 4,137 € 3,762 € 4,381 € 4345 
∆E[NPV of other contr. 
& taxes]  
€ 4,103 € 5,613 € 4,552 € 4493 





Appendix C: Effects of different institutional changes  
Here we document the effects of various alternative reforms apart from the introduction of 
disincentives. Tables C1 shows the effects of certain tax/pension parameters on retirement age. These 
effects are measured by assuming the values from 1998 (the first year of this study) for all other years. 
Figure C1 presents an alternative reform-scenario, which implements a pension cut of a various levels. 
Panel (a) shows how much the pensions would have to decrease to yield a certain amount of net public 
returns. Panel (b) provides estimates on the corresponding individual welfare losses. Table C2 shows 
further results of this counterfactual scenario. 
Table C1: Predicted effects of various reforms 
 Predicted effect on retirement age in month  
Cohort Disincentives 
Pension value 
constant Tax system constant Total predicted change 
1935 0 -0.0037798 0.3086298 0.30485 
1936 0 0.010305 0.306345 0.31665 
1937 1.1605 0.0136 0.3205 1.4946 
1938 4.1914 -0.0299 0.3171 4.4786 
1939 5.2811 0.0228 0.2984 5.6023 
1940 5.4339 0.1542 0.2788 5.8669 
1941 5.4546 0.3112 0.2548 6.0206 
1942 5.597 0.4855 0.3239 6.4064 
1943 5.5353 0.6321 0.3298 6.4972 
1944 5.6771 0.7385 0.3522 6.7678 
1945 5.6608 0.7227 0.3398 6.7233 
Note: Euro in 2010 real values. Pension value and tax system constant refer to scenarios where both are constant at the 
1998 level, the first year of this study. Source: SUFVSKT2002, 2004-12, own calculations. 
 
Table C2: Effects of pension cuts 
Pension cut 
Net public 
returns  CV 
Δ Retirement 
age (month) Δ Gini 







1% 2792 959 0.11033 0.21055 -2279 -14 
2% 5589 2132 0.224 0.42715 -4551 -28 
3% 8389 3303 0.34041 0.64724 -6815 -42 
4% 11193 4476 0.45975 0.87447 -9070 -56 
5% 14001 5642 0.58111 1.1089 -11318 -71 
6% 16813 6813 0.70536 1.3496 13557 -85 
7% 19629 7979 0.83244 1.5997 -15788 -99 
8% 22451 9147 0.96449 1.848 -18007 -113 
9% 25278 10313 1.1001 2.1045 -20218 -127 
10% 28111 11483 1.239 2.3701 -22419 -141 
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